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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the Merton portfolio management problem
in the context of non-exponential discounting. This gives rise to time-inconsistency
of the decision-maker. If the decision-maker at time t = 0 can commit his/her suc-
cessors, he/she can choose the policy that is optimal from his/her point of view, and
constrain the others to abide by it, although they do not see it as optimal for them.
If there is no commitment mechanism, one must seek a subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategy between the successive decision-makers. In the line of the earlier work by
Ekeland and Lazrak [5] we give a precise definition of equilibrium strategies in the
context of the portfolio management problem, with finite horizon, we characterize
it by a system of partial differential equations, and we show existence in the case
when the utility is CRRA and the terminal time T is small. We also investigate the
infinite-horizon case and we give two different explicit solutions in the case when the
utility is CRRA (in contrast with the case of exponential discount, where there is
only one). Some of our results are proved under the assumption that the discount
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2function h(t) is a linear combination of two exponentials, or is the product of an
exponential by a linear function.
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1. Introduction
The discounted utility model (DU) has been in use since the beginning of economic
theory. Landmark papers ar the ones by Ramsey in 1928 and Samuelson in 1937.
There is by now a very rich literature, the common assumption being that the dis-
count rate is constant over time so the discount function is exponential. The model
makes it possible to compare outcomes occurring at different times by discounting
future utility by some constant factor. A decision maker with high discount rates ex-
hibit more impatience (care more about the future) than one with low discount rates.
Most of financial-economics works have considered that the rate of time preference
is constant (exponential discounting). However there is growing evidence to suggest
that this may not be the case. Ainslie [1] performed empirical studies on human and
animal behavior and found that discount functions are almost hyperbolic. Loewen-
stein and Prelec [9] show four drawbacks of exponential discounting and propose a
model which accounts for them. They discuss implications for savings behavior and
estimation of discount rates.
As soon as discounting is non-exponential, the decision-maker becomes time-
inconsistent: a policy, to be implemented after time t > 0, which is optimal when
discounted at time 0, no longer is optimal if it is discounted at a later time, for in-
stance t. If the decision-maker at time 0 can commit the later ones, that is, constrain
them to follow the policy he/she has decided upon, then the policy which is optimal
from his/her perspective can be implemented. But, apart for the dubious validity of
doing that (why should his/her perspective be better than the one of decision-maker
at time t, who, after all, will have to carry out a policy decided long before, and will
be the one to bear its consequences ?) it is not often the case that management deci-
sions are irreversible; there will usually be many opportunities to reverse a decision
which, as times goes by, seems ill-advised.
Existing Research
Dynamic inconsistent behavior was first formalized analytically by Strotz [16].
Further work by Pollak [15], Peleg and Yaari [13], Goldmann [6] on this issue ad-
vocates that the policies to be followed should be the output of an intra-personal
3game among different temporal selves (today’s self is a different player from tomor-
row’s self). Laibson [10] considers a discrete time consumption-investment economy
without uncertainty. An agent (self) observes past consumption and financial wealth
levels and chooses the consumption level for period t. They establish existence of
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. It is characterized by time-dependent con-
sumption rules which are linear in wealth and should satisfy an Euler type equation.
The work of Barro [2] is in a non-stochastic Ramsey model with logarithmic utility,
and the discount function as a special form, whereby the rate of time preference is
high in the near future but almost constant in the distant future. Krusell and Smith
[8] also consider a discrete non-stochastic Ramsey paradigm with quasi-geometric
discounting. They seek the equilibrium policy as the solution of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium where the players are the agent and her future selves, and they show
that there are several solutions to this problem. All this work is in the deterministic
case, usually with discrete time.
Ekeland and Lazrak [5] consider a deterministic problem with continuous time,
namely the Ramsey problem of economic growth with non-exponential discounting.
They define an subgame perfect equilibrium strategies by letting the decision maker
at time t build a coalition with his/her immediate successors s, with s ∈ [t, t + ǫ]
and by letting ǫ → 0. They show that these strategies are characterized by two
equivalent equations: a partial differential equation with a non-local term and an
integral equation. The PDE coincide with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann equation
of optimal control if the discounting is exponential.
Our Contributions
Dynamic asset allocation has been an area in finance which received a lot of at-
tention lately. The ground-breaking paper in this literature is Merton [12]. He
considered a model consisting of a risk-free asset with constant rate of return and
one or more stocks, each with constant mean rate of return and volatility. An agent
invests in this market and consume to maximize her expected utility of intertempo-
ral consumption and final wealth. Merton was able to derive closed form solution
for Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) preferences. It turns out for CRRA preferences, the optimal consumption
and investment in the risky asset are a constant proportion of wealth. This is not
the case for CARA although they are still linear in wealth. Karatzas et al. [7], Cox
and Huang [4] also solved the optimal investment and consumption problem by the
static martingale method. In another paper Merton [11] also investigates the infinite
horizon case. Although it yields the same quantitative results it is easier to handle
- provided the constant discount rate satisfies a condition known in the literature as
the transversality condition. It does not seem to have much empirical support, and
what happens if it is not satisfied is a matter of debate.
4All the papers mentioned above are in the exponential discounting paradigm which
as we shown earlier was challenged by some economic literature.
The goal of this paper is to understand how non-exponential discounting affects
an agent’s investment-consumption policies in a Merton model. First we show that
doing naive optimization does not work in the absence of commitment technologies.
Then we follow the approach of [5] and introduce the concept of equilibrium policies
in a stochastic context. In the finite horizon case we give a first description of
the equilibrium policies for a general discount function through the solutions of a
flow of BSDEs. If the discount function is exponential, these conditions reduce
to the classical HJB equation, so the equilibrium policy coincide with the optimal
one given by dynamic programming. We then introduce special classes of discount
functions, type I which is a linear combination of two exponentials, and type II which
is the product of an exponential by a polynomial of degree one, and we show that
for discount functions in that class, equilibrium solutions can be characterized by a
system of HJB equations. We go one step further and characterize them through a
parabolic PDE system. This system does not seem to have been considered before.
Existence of a solution can be established in the case of CRRA utility.
It is perhaps surprising that the same integral equation (IE) from [5] holds in this
model for the special discounts. This suggests that (IE) holds for any discounts. We
can see this for other types of discount but we are not concern with a general result
in this direction. In an infinite horizon model the novel feature is stationarity and
the key observation is, to borrow a sentence from [5], the decision maker at time t
resets her watch so that time s becomes s− t, so she faces the same problem as the
decision-maker at time 0. Keeping this in mind we define the equilibrium policies in
this context. We follow the same approach as for finite horizon: first we describe them
through the solutions of a infinite horizon BSDE and then for the special discounts
through an ODE system and an integral equation. We end this case with the study of
CRRA preferences were we find interesting results. As one might probably expected
the equilibrium policies and optimal ones coincide if the discounting is exponential
given the transversality condition of [11]. However we find a weaker condition to
grant existence of an equilibrium policy so there may be circumstances when the
equilibrium policy exists but the optimal one may not (in the sense that one can not
perform the verification argument). Even more interesting for type I discounts we
find instances when there are two equilibrium policies. Moreover transversality-like
conditions were worked out. The equilibrium policies for CRRA preferences resemble
the optimal ones. More precisely the agent invests the same constant proportion of
her wealth in the risky asset as in the Merton problem and consumes also a constant
proportion of her wealth which is different than the Merton one for non-exponential
discounting.
Organization of the paper
5The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the
model and formulate the objective. Section 3 and 4 treat the finite horizon and
infinite horizon problem. The conclusions are summarized in section 5. The paper
ends with Appendix containing the proofs.
2. The model and problem formulation
2.1. Financial Market. We adopt a model for the financial market consisting of a
saving account and one stock (risky asset). The inclusion of more risky assets can be
achieved by notational changes. The saving account accrues interest at the riskless
rate r > 0. The stock price per share follows an exponential Brownian motion
dS(t) = S(t) [α dt+ σ dW (t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞,
where {W (t)}t∈[0,∞) is a 1−dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered probability
space (Ω, {Ft}0≤t≤T ,F , P ). The filtration {Ft}0≤t≤T is the completed filtration gen-
erated by {W (t)}t∈[0,∞). As usual α is the mean rate of return and σ > 0 is the
volatility. Let us denote µ , α− r > 0 the excess return.
2.2. Investment-consumption policies and wealth processes. A decision-maker
in this market is continuously investing her wealth in the stock/bond and is consum-
ing. An investment-consumption policy is determined by the proportion of current
wealth her/she invests in the bond/stock and consume (consumption rate). Formally
we have:
Definition 2.1. An R2-valued stochastic process {ζ(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞ is called an ad-
missible policy process if it is progressively measurable, c(t) ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0,∞)
and it satisfies
sup
0≤t≤T
E[|ζ(t)|m + cm(t)] <∞ ∀m = 1, 2, · · · , (2.1)
This condition originates from [14] and is needed since we are using their result.
Given a policy process {ζ(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞), the proportion of the wealth Xζ,c(t), at
time t invested in the stock is ζ(t) and the consumption rate is c(t). The equation
describing the dynamics of wealth Xζ,c(t) is given by
dXζ,c(t) = Xζ,c(t) ((αζ(t)− c(t)) dt+ σζ(t) dW (t)) + (1− ζ(t))Xζ,c(t)r dt
= Xζ,c(t)((r + µζ(t)− c(t)) dt+ σζ(t) dW (t)) . (2.2)
It simply says that the changes in wealth over time are due solely to gains/loses from
investing in stock, from consumption and there is no cashflow coming in or out. This
is usually referred to as the self-financing condition.
6Under the regularity condition (2.1) imposed on ζ(t) and c(t) above, (2.2), admits
a unique strong solution given by the explicit expression
Xζ,c(t) = X(0) exp
(∫ t
0
(
r + µζ(u)− c(u)− |σζ(u)|2
)
du+
∫ t
0
σζ(u) dW (u)
)
,
The initial wealth Xζ,c(0) = X(0) ∈ (0,∞), is exogenously specified.
2.3. Utility Function. All decision-makers have the same von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. This is crucial for understanding the model: time-inconsistency arise, not
from a change in preferences, but from the way the future is discounted. All decision-
makers try to maximize the discounted expectation of a function U : (0,∞) → R
strictly increasing and strictly concave, which is their (common) utility. We restrict
ourselves to utility functions which are continuous differentiable and satisfy the Inada
conditions
U ′(0+) , lim
x↓0
U ′(x) =∞, U ′(∞) , lim
x↑∞
U ′(x) = 0. (2.3)
We shall denote by I(·) the (continuous, strictly decreasing) inverse of the marginal
utility function U ′(·), and by (2.3)
I(0+) , lim
x↓0
I(x) =∞, I(∞) , lim
x↑∞
I(x) = 0. (2.4)
The agent is deriving utility from intertemporal consumption and final wealth. Let U
be the utility of intertemporal consumption and Uˆ the utility of the terminal wealth
at some non-random horizon T (which is a primitive of the model and we may alow
it to be infinite).
2.4. Discount Function. Unlike other works in this area we do not restrict our-
selves to the framework of exponential discounting. Following [5], a discount function
h : [0,∞]→ R is assumed to be continuously differentiable, with:
h(0) = 1, h(s) ≥ 0,
and ∫ ∞
0
h(t) dt <∞.
The definition and characterization of equilibrium strategies (Theorems 3.2 and 4.2)
hold for general discount functions. We will then particularize them to two special
cases, which we will call pseudo-exponential discount functions. They are of two
types, type I:
h1(t) = λ exp(−ρ1t) + (1− λ) exp(−ρ2t) (2.5)
and type II:
h2(t) = (1 + λt) exp(−ρt) (2.6)
7Pseudo-exponential discount rates were first considered in the context of time-
inconsistency in [5]. Note that, in contrast to the more studied case of hyperbolic
discount, decision-makers discount the distant future less heavily than the immediate
future. It will be clear from our approach how to handle other cases.
2.5. Objective. We conclude this section by formulating our problem. The objec-
tive is to find time consistent policies and the optimal ones may fail to have this
feature. Indeed, if the agent starts with a given positive wealth x, at some instant t,
her optimal policy process {ζ˜t(s), c˜t(s)}u∈[t,T ] is chosen such that
sup
ζ,c
E
[∫ T
t
h(u− t)U(c(u)Xζ,c(u)) du+ h(T − t)Uˆ(Xζ,c(T ))
]
=
= E
[∫ T
t
h(u− t)U(c˜(u)X ζ˜,c˜(u)) du+ h(T − t)Uˆ(X ζ˜,c˜(T ))
]
.
The value function associated with this stochastic control problem is
V (t, s, x) , sup
ζ,c
E
[∫ T
s
h(u− t)U(c(u)Xζ,c(u)) du+ h(T − s)Uˆ(Xζ,c(T ))
∣∣∣∣X(s) = x
]
,
t ≤ s ≤ T, and it solves the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
∂V
∂s
(t, s, x) + sup
ζ,c
[
(r + µζ − c)x∂V
∂x
(t, s, x) +
1
2
σ2ζ2x2
∂2V
∂x2
(t, s, x)
]
+
h′(s− t)
h(s− t) V (t, s, x) + U(xc) = 0,
with the boundary condition
V (t, T, x) = Uˆ(x). (2.7)
The first order necessary conditions yield the t−optimal policy {ζ˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t,T ]
ζ˜t(s, x) = −
µ∂V
∂x
(t, s, x)
σ2x∂
2V
∂x2
(t, s, x)
, t ≤ s ≤ T, (2.8)
c˜t(s, x) =
I(∂V
∂x
(t, s, x))
x
, t ≤ s ≤ T. (2.9)
Therefore, unless the discounting is exponential (in which case h
′
h
= constant, so
there is no t dependence in the HJB), the t−optimal policy may not be optimal after
t. That is
{ζ˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t′,T ] 6= argmaxζ,c E
[∫ T
t′
h(u− t′)U(c(u)Xζ,c(u)) du+ h(T − t′)Uˆ(Xζ,c(T ))
]
,
8for some subsequent instant t′, so the decision-maker would implement the t−optimal
policy at later times only if she is constrained to do so. This failure to remain optimal
across times can be regarded as time inconsistency.
Because of time-inconsistency, optimal solutions are irrelevant in practice (al-
though they do exist mathematically) and one must look for an alternative way
to solve the problem. This will be done by considering equilibrium policies, that is,
policies such that, given that they will be implemented in the future, it is individually
optimal to implement them right now. Following [5] consider:
ζ¯(s, x) =
F1(s, x)
x
, c¯(s, x) =
F2(s, x)
x
, (2.10)
for some functions F1, F2 and the equilibrium wealth process {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] evolves
according to
dX¯(s) = [rX¯(s) + µF1(s, X¯(s))− F2(s, X¯(s))]ds+ σF1(s, X¯(s))dW (s). (2.11)
The functions F1, F2 are chosen such that on [t, t+ǫ] it is optimal (this is made precise
in our formal definition of equilibrium policies) to pick ζ¯(t, x) = F1(t,x)
x
, c¯(t, x) =
F2(t,x)
x
, given the agent’s wealth at time t is x, and for every subsequent instance
s ≥ t+ ǫ she follows (2.10).
3. Finite Horizon
3.1. General Discount Function. Let T be a finite time horizon exogenously
specified. In general, for a policy process {ζ(s), c(s)}s∈[0,T ] satisfying (2.1) and its
corresponding wealth process {X(s)}s∈[0,T ] (see (2.2)) we denote the expected utility
functional
J(t, x, ζ, c) , E
[∫ T
t
h(s− t)U(c(s)X t,x(s)) ds+ h(T − t)Uˆ(X t,x(T ))
]
. (3.1)
We shall give a rigorous mathematical formulation of the equilibrium policies in the
formal definition below.
Definition 3.1. A map F = (F1, F2) : (0,∞)× [0, T ]→ R× [0,∞) is an equilibrium
policy for the finite horizon investment-consumption problem, if for any t, x > 0
lim
ǫ↓0
J(t, x, F1, F2)− J(t, x, ζǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
≥ 0, (3.2)
where
J(t, x, F1, F2) , J(t, x, ζ¯ , c¯),
ζ¯(s) =
F1(s, X¯(s))
X¯(s)
, c¯(s) =
F2(s, X¯(s))
X¯(s)
, (3.3)
9and {ζ¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] should satisfy (2.1). The equilibrium wealth process {X¯(s)}s∈[t,T ]
is a solution of the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dX(s) = [rX(s) + µF1(s,X(s))− F2(s,X(s))]ds+ σF1(s,X(s))dW (s). (3.4)
The process {ζǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] is another investment-consumption policy defined
by
ζǫ(s) =
{
ζ¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,t
ζ(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t,
(3.5)
cǫ(s) =
{
c¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,t
c(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t,
(3.6)
with Eǫ,t = [t, t + ǫ], and {ζ(s), c(s)}s∈[t,T ] is any policy for which {ζǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ]
satisfy (2.1).
The basic idea is the following: the agent (self) has a different rate of impatience
h′(t)
h(t)
as times goes by (unless the discounting is exponential) and can be regarded
as a continuum of agents (selves); at every instant t she is building a coalition with
her immediate selves s, with s ∈ [t, t + ǫ] and try to maximize expected utility of
intertemporal consumption and terminal wealth given that the selves on [t + ǫ, T ]
agreed upon an equilibrium strategy.
Our next item in the agenda is to characterize the equilibrium policies by a means
of some adjoint processes defined by a flow (one for every instant t) of backward
stochastic differential equations (BSDE). More precisely for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T the
processes {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] are a solution of the BSDE


dM(t, s) = −
(
M(t, s)
(
r + µ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
)
+ σ ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))N(t, s)+
+h(s− t)∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′(F2(s, X¯(s)))
)
ds+N(t, s)dW (s)
M(t, T ) = h(T − t)Uˆ ′(X¯(T )),
(3.7)
where the equilibrium wealth process {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] follows (3.4).
The next central result does not depend on the choice of the discount function h.
Theorem 3.2. Assume there exists a map F = (F1, F2) : (0,∞)×[0, T ]→ R×(0,∞),
continuously differentiable with respect to x such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] there exists
a solution {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] of (3.7) which satisfies
µM(t, t) + σN(t, t) = 0, (3.8)
10
and
F2(t, x) = I(M(t, t)|X(t) = x). (3.9)
Then F is an equilibrium strategy.
Appendix A proves this Theorem.
3.2. Special Discount Functions. Following [5] we would like to give a character-
ization of the equilibrium policies in terms of both a partial differential equation and
an integral equation. We restrict ourselves to three types of discounting although
our method goes far beyond. We consider exponential, and pseudo-exponential dis-
counting. Let us introduce the Legendre transform of −U(−x)
U˜(y) , sup
x>0
[U(x)− xy] = U(I(y))− yI(y), 0 < y <∞. (3.10)
The function U˜(·) is strictly decreasing, strictly convex and satisfies the dual rela-
tionships
U˜ ′(y) = −x iff U ′(x) = −y. (3.11)
The next Theorem is our main result. It describes the equilibrium policies through
a coupled system of parabolic equations.
Theorem 3.3. Assume there exist two functions v(t, x) and w(t, x) three times con-
tinuously differentiable which satisfy
∂v
∂t
(t, x) + rx
∂v
∂x
(t, x)− µ
2
2σ2
[∂v
∂x
(t, x)]2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x)
+ U˜
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
= α1jv(t, x) + β1jw(t, x),
∂w
∂t
(t, x) +
(
rx− I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
))
∂w
∂x
(t, x)− µ
2
σ2
∂v
∂x
(t, x)∂w
∂x
(t, x)
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x)
+
µ2
2σ2
[∂v
∂x
(t, x)]2 ∂
2w
∂x2
(t, x)
[∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x)]2
= α2jv(t, x) + β2jw(t, x),
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (0,∞), with boundary condition
v(T, x) = Uˆ(x), w(T, x) = 0.
Then F = (F1, F2) given by
F1(t, x) = −
µ ∂v
∂x
(t, x)
σ2 ∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x)
, F2(t, x) = I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.12)
is an equilibrium policy. The coefficients αij, βij corresponds to different choices of
discount functions. Thus for exponential discounting
α10 = δ, α20 = 0, β10 = 0, β20 = 0,
11
for type I
α11 = λρ1+(1−λ)ρ2, α21 = ρ1−ρ2, β11 = λ(1−λ)(ρ1−ρ2), β21 = λρ2+(1−λ)ρ1,
and for type II
α12 = ρ− λ, α22 = −λ, β12 = λ, β22 = ρ+ λ.
Appendix B proves this Theorem.
Remark 3.4. Let us point out that for the case of exponential discounting the equi-
librium policy coincide with the optimal one given by dynamic programming. Note
that the value function v
v(t, x) = sup
ζ,c
E
[∫ T
t
e−δ(s−t)U(c(s)Xζ,c(s)) ds+ e−δ(T−t)Uˆ(Xζ,c(T ))
∣∣∣∣X(t) = x
]
,
(3.13)
and w = 0 satisfies the PDE system of Theorem 3.3.
The next Proposition is in the spirit of Theorem 2 in [5] and gives a description of
the equilibrium policy through an integral equation. It is stated only for the special
discounts.
Proposition 3.5. Assume there exist two functions v(t, x) and w(t, x) three times
continuously differentiable which solve the PDE system of Theorem 3.3. Then v(t, x)
satisfy the integral equation
v(t, x) = E
[∫ T
t
h(s− t)U(F2(s, X¯ t,x(s))) ds+ h(T − t)Uˆ(X¯ t,x(T ))
]
, (3.14)
Recall that {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] is the equilibrium wealth process and it satisfies
dX¯(s) = [rX¯(s) + µF1(s, X¯(s))− F2(s, X¯(s))]ds+ σF1(s, X¯(s))dW (s). (3.15)
Appendix C proves this Proposition.
Remark 3.6. This Proposition suggests that for a general discount function h(t) the
equilibrium policies are of the form (3.12) for a function v as in (3.14). It is not hard
to see it holds for h(t) = (1 + λ11t + λ12t
2 + · · · ) exp(−ρ1t) + (1 + λ21t + λ22t2 +
· · · ) exp(−ρ2t).
In the next Proposition stochastic representations for v and w are given.
Proposition 3.7. Assume there exist two functions v(t, x) and w(t, x) three times
continuously differentiable which solve the PDE system of Theorem 3.3. Then
w(t, x) = E
[
α2j
∫ T
t
exp(−β2j(s− t))v(s, X¯ t,x(s)) ds
]
,
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v(t, x) = E
[ ∫ T
t
exp(−α1j(s− t))
[
U
(
I
(
∂v
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s)
))
−
β1jw(s, X¯
t,x(s))
]
ds+ h(T − t)Uˆ(X¯ t,x(T ))
]
.
Therefore
v(t, x) = E
[ ∫ T
t
exp(−α1j(s− t))
[
U
(
I
(
∂v
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s)
))
−
−α2jβ1j
∫ T
s
exp(−α2j(z − s))v(z, X¯ t,x(z)) dz
]
ds+ h(T − t)Uˆ(X t,x(T ))
]
.
Proof: It is a direct consequence of Feynman-Kac’s formula.

The main question (since all the results of this section are based on it) is: when
does the system of Theorem 3.3 have solutions? Of course the answer is known for
exponential discounting. Although there is work in progress, we only have a partial
answer at the moment and that is for CRRA preferences, U(x) = Uˆ(x) = x
p
p
. In
this case one can disentangle time and wealth and look for v(t, x) = f(t)x
p
p
and
w(t, x) = g(t)x
p
p
, where f(t), g(t) solve the ODE system
f ′(s) +Kf(s) + (1− p)[f(s)] pp−1 = α1jf(s) + β1jg(s), (3.16)
g′(s) +Kg(s)− pg(s)[f(s)] 1p−1 = β2jf(s) + β2jg(s), (3.17)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] with boundary condition
f(T ) = 1, g(T ) = 0,
where K = rp + µ
2p
2σ2(p−1)
. Existence of this is obvious on small intervals (up to
explosions) [T − ǫ, T ] for some ǫ > 0. One can get a global result for small βij (small
λ) by the Implicit Function Theorem.
4. Infinite Horizon
We next investigate stationary equilibrium policies and this is done in the infinite
horizon framework. Before engaging into the formal definition let us point the follow-
ing key fact. For a time homogenous policy process {ζ(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞) satisfying (2.1)
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and its corresponding wealth process {X(t)}t∈[0,∞) (see (2.2)) the expected utility
functional J(x, ζ, c) satisfies
J(x, ζ, c) , E
[∫ ∞
t
h(s− t)U(c(s)X t,x(s)) ds
]
(4.1)
= E
[∫ ∞
0
h(s)U(c(s)X t,x(t+ s)) ds
]
.
= E
[∫ ∞
0
h(s)U(c(s)X0,x(s)) ds
]
.
This is due to the fact that the processes {X t,x(t + s)}s∈[0,∞) and {X0,x(s)}s∈[0,∞)
have the same P distribution. Following the case of finite horizon we have:
Definition 4.1. A map F = (F1, F2) : (0,∞)→ R× [0,∞) is an equilibrium policy
for the infinite horizon investment-consumption problem, if for any x > 0
lim
ǫ↓0
J(x, F1, F2)− J(x, ζǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
≥ 0, (4.2)
where
J(x, F1, F2) , J(x, ζ¯, c¯),
ζ¯(t) =
F1(X¯(t))
X¯(t)
, c¯(t) =
F2(X¯(t))
X¯(t)
, (4.3)
and {ζ¯(t), c¯(t)}t∈[0,∞) should satisfy (2.1). The equilibrium wealth process {X¯(t)}t∈[0,∞)
satisfies
dX¯(t) = [rX¯(t) + µF1(X¯(t))− F2(X¯(t))]dt+ σF1(X¯(t))dW (t). (4.4)
The process {ζǫ(t), cǫ(t)}t∈[0,∞) is another time homogenous investment-consumption
policy defined by
ζǫ(t) =
{
ζ¯(t), t ∈ [0,∞)\Eǫ
ζ(t), t ∈ Eǫ,
(4.5)
cǫ(t) =
{
c¯(t), t ∈ [0,∞)\Eǫ
c(t), t ∈ Eǫ.
(4.6)
Here Eǫ ⊂ [0,∞) is a measurable set with Lebesque measure |Eǫ| = ǫ, and {ζ(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞)
is any time homogenous policy for which {ζǫ(t), cǫ(t)}t∈[0,∞) satisfies (2.1).
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In a first step we would like to describe the equilibrium policies in terms of the
process {M(t), N(t)}t∈[0,∞), the solution of the infinite horizon BSDE

dM(t) = −(M(t)(µF ′1(X¯(t))− F ′2(X¯(t)) + σF ′1(X¯(t))N(t)
+h(t)F ′2(X¯(t))U
′(F2(X¯(t)))dt+N(t)dW (t)
M(∞) = 0, t ∈ [0,∞),
(4.7)
and the equilibrium wealth process {X¯(t)}t∈[0,∞) it is given by (4.4). For more about
infinite horizon BSDE see [3]. The next result is the infinite horizon counterpart of
Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 4.2. Assume there exists a map F = (F1, F2) : (0,∞)→ R× (0,∞), con-
tinuously differentiable with respect to x such that there exists a solution {M(t), N(t)}t∈[0,∞)
of (4.7) which satisfy
µM(0) + σN(0) = 0, (4.8)
and
F2(x) = I(M(0)|X(t) = x). (4.9)
Then F is an equilibrium strategy.
The proof is similar to Theorem 4.2, so it is skipped.

As in the preceding Section we find the equilibrium policies for exponential, type
I and type II discounting. With the coefficients αij and βij as in Theorem 3.3, we
have the following formal result.
Theorem 4.3. Assume there exist two functions v(x) and w(x) three times contin-
uously differentiable which solve the following ODE system
rxv′(x)− µ
2
2σ2
v′2(x)
v′′(x)
+ U˜ (v′(x)) = α1jv(x) + β1jw(x),
(rx− I(v′(x)))w′(x)− µ
2
σ2
v′(x)w′(x)
w′′(x)
+
µ2
2σ2
[v′(x)]2w′′(x)
[v′′(x)]2
= α2jv(x) + β2jw(x),
for all x ∈ (0,∞). If in addition the following transversality condition
M(∞) = 0, (4.10)
is satisfied, then F = (F1, F2) given by
F1(x) = − µv
′(x)
σ2v′′(x)
, F2(x) = I(v
′(x)), (4.11)
is an equilibrium policy.
The proof follows as in Theorem 3.3.
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
The next Proposition gives the description of equilibrium policies through an in-
tegral equation (IE) as in the Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 4.4. Assume there exist two functions v(x) and w(x) three times con-
tinuously differentiable which solve the ODE system of Theorem 4.3. Then v(x)
satisfies the integral equation
v(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
h(t)U(F2(X¯
0,x(t))) dt
]
. (4.12)
The proof follows as in Proposition 4.3.

4.1. CRRA Preferences. In this subsection we are still in the paradigm of expo-
nential, type I, type II discounts and further investigate the case of U(x) = x
p
p
. Lets
look for the function v of the form v(x) = kx
p
p
, for a constant k which is to be found.
The equilibrium policies are linear in wealth
F1(x) =
µx
(1− p)σ2 , F2(x) = k
1
p−1x, (4.13)
and the corresponding wealth process is
X¯(t) = X(0) exp
((
r +
(1− 2p)µ2
2(1− p)2σ2 − k
1
p−1
)
t+
µ
(1− p)σW (t)
)
. (4.14)
According to Proposition 4.4 the value function v should satisfy the integral equation
(4.12) (and this is also sufficient to grant that F1, F2 of (4.13) is an equilibrium
policy), which in this context becomes
k
1
1−p =
∫ ∞
0
h(u)ek˜u du, (4.15)
where
k˜ = p
(
r +
µ2
2(1− p)σ2 − k
1
p−1
)
. (4.16)
Let us treat the three cases independently.
4.1.1. Exponential Discounting. With h(t) = exp(−δt), (4.15) reads
k
1
1−p (δ − k˜) = 1, (4.17)
given that
δ > k˜. (4.18)
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Thus
k =
[
1
1− p
(
δ − rp− pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)]p−1
. (4.19)
The condition
δ > (p ∨ 0)
[
µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
]
, (4.20)
should hold true in view of positivity of k.
The adjoint process {M(t)}t∈[0,∞) is given by
M(t) = exp(−δt)v′(X¯(t))
= kX(0)
[
exp
((
r(p− 1) + (2p− 1)µ
2
2(1− p)σ2 − (p− 1)k
1
p−1 − δ
)
t+
µ
σ
W (t)
)]
=
kX(0)
[
exp
(
−
(
r +
µ2
2σ2
)
t +
µ
σ
W (t)
)]
,
whence the condition M(∞) = 0 is automatically satisfied.
Remark 4.5. Condition (4.20) is weaker than the transversality condition
δ > (p ∨ 0)
[
(2− p)µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
]
, (4.21)
of [11]. If (4.21) is met the equilibrium policy coincide with the optimal policy given
by dynamic programming. However if
(p ∨ 0)
[
µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
]
< δ ≤ (p ∨ 0)
[
(2− p)µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
]
,
equilibrium policy still exists but one cannot prove verification for the optimal policy.
4.1.2. Type I Discounting. If h(t) = λ exp(−ρ1t)+(1−λ) exp(−ρ2t), equation (4.15)
leads to
k
1
1−p =
λ
ρ1 − k˜
+
1− λ
ρ2 − k˜
, (4.22)
given that
ρi − k˜ > 0, i = 1, 2. (4.23)
This can be expressed as the positive root of the quadratic equation for z = k
1
p−1
Q(z) = Az2 +Bz + C = 0, (4.24)
where
A , 1− p, (4.25)
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B , (2p− 1)
(
µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
)
+
λρ2 + (1− λ)ρ1
p
− (ρ1 + ρ2), (4.26)
C , −1
p
(
ρ1 − rp− pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)(
ρ2 − rp− pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)
. (4.27)
When ρ1 = ρ2 = δ, the equation (4.24) becomes[
(1− p)z −
(
δ − pr − pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)][
z +
1
p
(
δ − pr − pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)]
= 0, (4.28)
which compered to (4.19) brings in a new solution
zδ =
[
−1
p
(
δ − rp− pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)]
. (4.29)
Thus when ρ1, ρ2 are close to δ the equation (4.24) has at least a positive solution
provided that δ satisfies (4.20). It has two positive solutions if p < 0.
Let us search for the transversality condition sufficient to grant (4.10) (M(∞) = 0).
The process {M(t)}t∈[0,∞) is given by
M(t) , λ exp(−ρ1t)v′1(X¯(t)) + (1− λ) exp(−ρ2t)v′2(X¯(t)), (4.30)
where
vi(x) = E
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(F2(X¯
t,x
s )) ds
]
, i = 1, 2. (4.31)
Consequently
vi(x) =
k
p
1−pxp
p(ρi − k˜)
, i = 1, 2. (4.32)
Furthermore, for i = 1, 2
exp(−ρis)v′i(X¯(t))
=
X(0)k
p
1−p
(ρi − k˜)
[
exp
((
r(p− 1) + (2p− 1)µ
2
2(1− p)σ2 − (p− 1)k
1
p−1 − ρi
)
t +
µ
σ
W (t)
)]
.
Therefore the transversality condition reads
k
1
p−1 < r +
1
1− p
[
ρi − (2p− 1)µ
2
2(1− p)σ2
]
, i = 1, 2. (4.33)
In general it is not obvious if the equation (4.24) has a positive solutions for which
the transversality condition and (4.23) are met. However this is the case when the
ρi are close to δ and δ satisfies (4.20).
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It is interesting to note that in some cases there may be two equilibrium policies.
Let us illustrate this in an example: we take p > 1
2
, p ≃ 1
2
and denote y , r+ µ
2
2(1−p)σ2
.
Moreover, for some small ǫ > 0 let ρ1 = py+ ǫ, ρ2 = py− ǫ, so that B = ǫ(1−2λ)p , and
C = ǫ
2
p
. If λ >
1+
√
4p(1−p)
2
, λ ≃ 1+
√
4p(1−p)
2
the roots of (4.24), z1,2 ≃ ǫ√
p(1−p)
> ǫ
p
so
that (4.23) holds true. The transversality condition (4.33) is satisfied if ǫ is chosen
small enough.
4.1.3. Type II Discounting. If h(t) = (1 + λt) exp(−ρt), equation (4.15) leads to
k
1
1−p =
1
ρ− k˜ +
λ
(ρ− k˜)2 , (4.34)
given that
ρ− k˜ > 0. (4.35)
This can be expressed as the positive root of the quadratic equation for z = k
1
p−1
Q(z) = Az2 +Bz + C = 0, (4.36)
with
A , 1− p, (4.37)
B , (2p− 1)
(
µ2
2(1− p)σ2 + r
)
+
ρ(1− 2p)
p
+
λ
p
, (4.38)
C = −1
p
(
ρ− rp− pµ
2
2(1− p)σ2
)2
. (4.39)
The transversality condition in this case is
k
1
p−1 < r +
1
1− p
[
ρ− (2p− 1)µ
2
2(1− p)σ2
]
. (4.40)
Similar to the type I discounting it is possible to establish a positive solution of
(4.36) which satisfy (4.35) and (4.40) when λ is close to zero.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced a novel concept in stochastic optimization namely the notion
of equilibrium policies. We analyze the Merton portfolio management problem in
the context of exponential and non-exponential discounting. Although type I, II
and exponential discounting are considered only, our methodology can be extended
for more general discount functions. The optimal policies are characterized by both
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an integral equation and a system of partial differential equations. The infinite
horizon case is covered as well and it is shown that in some situations there are more
equilibrium policies. Moreover for CRRA preferences the equilibrium policies are to
consume and invest in the risky asset a constant proportion of the corresponding
wealth, which is similar to the optimal policy for exponential discounting, but the
constants are different.
6. Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 3.2
We assume Uˆ = r = 0 to ease the presentation. Let {Xǫ(s)}s∈[0,T ] be the wealth
corresponding to {ζǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[0,T ] i.e.,
dXǫ(s) = Xǫ(s)((r + µζǫ(s)− cǫ(s)) ds+ σζǫ(s) dW (s)). (6.1)
The processes {Y ǫ(s)}s∈[0,T ] and {Zǫ(s)}s∈[0,T ] defined by the SDE

dY ǫ(s) = Y ǫ(s)(µ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))) ds+ σ[Y ǫ(t)∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s)+
+(X¯(s)ζ(s)− F1(s, X¯(s))χEǫ(s)] dW (s)
Y ǫ(0) = 0
(6.2)
and


dZǫ(s) = [Zǫ(s)(µ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)))+
+(µX¯(s)(ζ(s)− ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s)))− (c(s)X¯(s)− F2(s, X¯(s))χEǫ(s)] ds+
+[σZǫ(s)∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)) + (σY ǫ(s)(ζ(s)− ∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))χEǫ(s)] dW (s)
Zǫ(0) = 0
can be regarded as first order and second order variation of {X(s)}s∈[0,T ]
At this point we need the following Lemma from [14].
Lemma 6.1. For any k ≥ 1
sup
s∈[0,∞]
E|Xǫ(s)− X¯(s)|2k = O(ǫk), (6.3)
sup
s∈[0,∞]
E|Y ǫ(s)|2k = O(ǫk), (6.4)
sup
s∈[0,∞]
E|Zǫ(s)|2k = O(ǫ2k), (6.5)
sup
s∈[0,∞]
E|Xǫ(s)− X¯(s)− Y ǫ(s)|2k = O(ǫ2k) (6.6)
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sup
s∈[0,∞]
E|Xǫ(s)− X¯(s)− Y ǫ(s)− Zǫ(s)|2k = o(ǫ2k) (6.7)
In the light of this Lemma the following expansion holds:
J(t, x, ζǫ, cǫ) = J(t, x, F1, F2)
+E
∫ T
t
(
h(s− t)(U(c(s)X¯ t,x(s))− U(F2(X¯ t,x(s)))χEǫ(s)
+h(s− t)(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s))U ′
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s))
))
ds+ o(ǫ)
In the above equation we would like to get rid of {Y ǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ], {Zǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] and
the way to accomplish this is by using the adjoint processes {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ]
and integration by parts. It turns out
Y ǫ(s)
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
)
ds = −Y ǫ(s)dM(t, s)
−
[
Y ǫ(s)M(t, s)
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
+ σY ǫ(s)N(t, s)
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
]
ds
+Y ǫ(s)N(t, s) dW (s),
and
Zǫ(s)
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
)
ds = −Zǫ(s)dM(t, s)
−
[
Zǫ(s)M(t, s)
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
+ σZǫ(s)N(t, s)
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
]
ds
+Zǫ(s)N(t, s) dW (s),
Consequently
E
∫ T
t
h(s− t)(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
)
ds =
−E
∫ T
t
(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))dM(t, s)
−E
∫ T
t
[
(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))M(t, s)
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
+
σ(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))N(s)
]
ds.
Moreover by (6.2) and the equation following it
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E
∫ T
t
(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))M(t, s)
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
ds =
E
∫ T
t
M(t, s)d(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))
−E
∫ T
t
[M(t, s)(µX¯(s)(ζ(s)− F1(s, X¯(s)))− (X¯(s)c(s)− F2(s, X¯(s)))]χEǫ(s)) ds
Thanks to Itoˆ’s formula
d(M(t, s)(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s)) = M(t, s)d(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s)) + (Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))dM(t, s)
+ d(Y ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s))dM(t, s),
which in conjunction with the previous equations yield
E
∫ T
t
h(s− t)∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′(F2(s, X¯(s)))(Y
ǫ(s) + Zǫ(s)) ds
= E
∫ T
t
[M(t, s)µ(X¯(s)ζ(s)− F1(X¯(s))] ds
+E
∫ T
t
[(X¯(s)c(s)− F2(X¯(s)))− (σN(t, s)(X¯(s)ζ(s) + F1(X¯(s)))]χEǫ(s) ds
−E
∫ ∞
0
σM(t, s)Y ǫ(s)((ζ(s) + F1(X¯(s)))χEǫ(s) ds.
Next we introduce the Hamiltonian function H by
H(t, s, x, u,m, n) = mx(ζµ− c) + nxζσ + h(s− t)U(cx), u = (ζ, c). (6.8)
The asymptotical expansion leads to
J(t, x, F1, F2)−J(t, x, ζǫ, cǫ) = E
∫ T
t
σM(t, s)Y ǫ(s)
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s))−ζ(s)
)
χEǫ(s) ds
+E
∫ T
t
[H(t, s, X¯ t,x(s), ζ¯(s), c¯(s),M(t, s), N(t, s))
−H(t, s, X¯ t,x(s), ζ(s), c(s),M(t, s), N(t, s))]χEǫ(s) ds+ o(ǫ).
Additionally, with sufficient integrability assumptions and (6.4)
lim
ǫ↓0
E
∫ T
t
σM(t, s)Y ǫ(s)
(
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯ t,x(s))− ζ(s)
)
χEǫ(s) ds
ǫ
= 0, (6.9)
whence
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lim
ǫ↓0
J(t, x, F1, F2)− J(t, x, ζǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
= E
[
H
(
t, t, x,
F1(t, x)
x
,
F2(t, x)
x
,M(t, t), N(t, t)
)
−H(t, t, x, ζ(t), c(t),M(t, t), N(t, t))
]
.
Therefore a sufficient condition for F = (F1, F2) to be a equilibrium policy is(
F1(t, x)
x
,
F2(t, x)
x
)
= argmaxζ,cH(t, t, x, ζ, c,M(t, t), N(t, t)), (6.10)
Finally, the linearity of H in ζ implies
µM(t, t) + σN(t, t) = 0, (6.11)
and the first order conditions for c (which are also sufficient due to concavity of
U)
F2(t, x) = I(M(t, t)|X(t) = x). (6.12)

B Proof of Theorem 3.3
The result is established for all three cases (exponential, type I, type II) separately.
Exponential discounting: h(t) = e−δt
Let v(t, x) be the solution of the classical HJB
∂v
∂t
(t, x) + rx
∂v
∂x
(t, x)− µ
2
2σ2
∂2v
∂x
(t, x)
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x)
+ U˜
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
= δv(t, x), (6.13)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (0,∞), with boundary condition
v(T, x) = Uˆ(x).
Then v(t, x) and w(t, x) = 0 solve the parabolic system.
We show the equilibrium strategies are
F1(t, x) = −
µ ∂v
∂x
(t, x)
σ2 ∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x)
, F2(t, x) = I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (6.14)
Indeed lets consider the processes
M(t, s) = e−δ(s−t)
∂v
∂x
(s, X¯(s)), N(t, s) = σe−δ(s−t)F1(s, X¯(s))
∂2v
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)), (6.15)
s ∈ [t, T ]. Recall that the equilibrium wealth process {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ], is defined by
dX¯(s) = [rX¯(s) + µF1(s, X¯(s))− F2(s, X¯(s))]ds+ σF1(s, X¯(s))dW (s). (6.16)
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It is a matter of direct calculations to prove that {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] solves BSDE
(3.7). Next we observe
µM(t, t) + σN(t, t) = 0, (6.17)
and
F2(t, x) = I(M(t, t)|X(t) = x), (6.18)
so by Theorem 3.2, F = (F1, F2) is an equilibrium strategy.

Type I discounting: h(t) = λ exp(−ρ1t) + (1− λ) exp(−ρ2t)
Let v and w be a solution of the PDE system. We show the equilibrium strategies
are
F1(t, x) = −
µ ∂v
∂x
(t, x)
σ2 ∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x)
, F2(t, x) = I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (6.19)
Let us define the process {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] by
M(t, s) , λ exp(−ρ1(s− t))∂v1
∂x
(s, X¯(s)) + (1− λ) exp(−ρ2(s− t))∂v2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)),
and
N(t, s) , λσ exp(−ρ1(s− t))F1(s, X¯(s))∂
2v1
∂x2
(s, X¯(s))
+(1− λ)σ exp(−ρ2(s− t))F1(s, X¯(s))∂
2v2
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)),
for some functions v1 and v2 which will be specified later on and {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] is
the equilibrium wealth process of (6.16) . By requesting {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] to
solve BSDE (3.7), one finds a PDE system for (v1, v2).
Indeed, on one hand by Itoˆ’s formula
dM(t, s) =
(
λ exp(−ρ1(s− t))
[
− ρ1∂v1
∂x
(s, X¯(s)) +
∂2v1
∂x∂s
(s, X¯(s))
+(µF1(s, X¯(s))− F2(s, X¯(s)))∂
2v1
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)) +
σ2
2
F 21 (s, X¯(s))
∂3v1
∂x3
(s, X¯(s))
]
+(1− λ) exp(−ρ2(s− t))
[
− ρ2∂v2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)) +
∂2v2
∂x∂s
(s, X¯(s))+
+(µF1(s, X¯(s))− F2(s, X¯(s)))∂
2v2
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)) +
σ2
2
F 21 (s, X¯(s))
∂3v2
∂x3
(s, X¯(s))
])
ds
+N(t, s)dW (s).
On the other hand from (3.7)
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dM(t, s) =
(
λ exp(−ρ1(s− t))
[
∂v1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
+
+σ2F1(s, X¯(s))
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
∂2v1
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)) +
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′(F2(s, X¯(s)))
]
+
+(1− λ) exp(−ρ2(s− t))
[
∂v2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))− ∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)
)
+
+σ2F1(s, X¯(s))
∂F1
∂x
(s, X¯(s))
∂2v2
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)) +
∂F2
∂x
(s, X¯(s))U ′(F2(s, X¯(s)))
])
ds+
+N(t, s)dW (s).
The two representations of dM(t, s) yield
−ρ1 ∂v1
∂x
(s, x) +
∂2v1
∂x∂s
(s, x) + (µF1(s, x)− F2(s, x))∂
2v1
∂x2
(s, x)
+
σ2
2
F 21 (s, x)
∂3v1
∂x3
(s, x) = −
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, x)− ∂F2
∂x
(s, x)
)
∂v
∂x
(s, x)
−σ2F1(s, x)∂F1
∂x
(s, x)
∂2v1
∂x2
(s, x)− ∂F2
∂x
(s, x)
∂v
∂x
(s, x),
and
−ρ2 ∂v2
∂x
(s, x) +
∂2v2
∂x∂s
(s, x) + (µF1(s, x)− F2(s, x))∂
2v2
∂x2
(s, x)
+
σ2
2
F 21 (s, x)
∂3v2
∂x3
(s, x) = −
(
µ
∂F1
∂x
(s, x)− ∂F2
∂x
(s, x)
)
∂v2
∂x
(s, x)
−σ2F1(s, x)∂F1
∂x
(s, x)
∂2v2
∂x2
(s, x)− ∂F2
∂x
(s, x)
∂v
∂x
(s, x).
This can be rewritten as
∂
∂x
[
∂v1
∂s
(s, x)− ρ1v1(s, x) + (µF1(s, x)− F2(s, x))∂v1
∂x
(s, x)
+
σ2
2
F 21 (s, x)
∂2v1
∂x2
(s, x) + U(F2(s, x))
]
= 0,
and
∂
∂x
[
∂v2
∂s
(s, x)− ρ2v2(s, x) + (µF1(s, x)− F2(s, x))∂v2
∂x
(s, x)
+
σ2
2
F 21 (s, x)
∂2v2
∂x2
(s, x) + U(F2(s, x))
]
= 0.
25
Recall that v and w is a solution of the PDE system. Thus
v1 , v + (1− λ)w, v2 , v − λw (6.20)
satisfy the above PDEs. Moreover
µM(t, t) + σN(t, t) = 0, (6.21)
and
F2(t, x) = I(M(t, t)|X(t) = x), (6.22)
so by Theorem 3.2, F = (F1, F2) is an equilibrium strategy.

Type II discounting: h(t) = (1 + λt) exp(−ρt)
Let v and w be a solution of the PDE system. We show the equilibrium strategies
are
F1(t, x) = −
µ ∂v
∂x
(t, x)
σ2 ∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x)
, F2(t, x) = I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (6.23)
Let us define the process {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] by
M(t, s) , exp(−ρ(s− t))∂v1
∂x
(s, X¯(s)) + λt exp(−ρ(s− t))∂v2
∂x
(s, X¯(s)),
and
N(t, s) , σ exp(−ρ1(s− t))F1(s, X¯(s))∂
2v1
∂x2
(s, X¯(s))
+σλt exp(−ρ2(s− t))F1(s, X¯(s))∂
2v2
∂x2
(s, X¯(s)),
for the functions
v1 , v, v2 , v − w. (6.24)
As for the case of type I one can check that {M(t, s), N(t, s)}s∈[t,T ] solves BSDE
(3.7). Moreover
µM(t, t) + σN(t, t) = 0, (6.25)
and
F2(t, x) = I(M(t, t)|X(t) = x), (6.26)
so by Theorem 3.2, F = (F1, F2) is an equilibrium strategy.

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C Proof of Proposition 3.5
If the discounting is exponential the result is a direct consequence of Feynman-
Kac’s formula. For type I, the functions v1 and v2 of (6.20) admit the following
stochastic representations
vi(t, x) = E
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(F2(X¯
t,x
s )) ds
]
, i = 1, 2, (6.27)
by Feynman-Kac’s formula. Consequently
v(t, x) = λv1(t, x) + (1− λ)v2(t, x) = E
[∫ T
t
h(s− t)U(F2(X¯ t,xs )) ds
]
. (6.28)
Similarly for type II, (6.28) holds true.

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